Saturday 12 December 2015


This is a specimen case of how an honest and upright government employee could be harassed by the corrupt administrative machinery and the extra ordinary reaction of the Supreme Court against it. Supreme Court vide its order dated 17/11/2015, directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to pay a lump sum of Rs.10 lakhs to a Government employee within a period of three months from the date of order towards compensation for the wrong done by the State.

Now the question remains, what action is taken against the real culprits including the PIL petitioner who had done these mischiefs? There is no direction from the Supreme Court in this regard. Also there is no direction regarding who to bear the burden of compensation i.e., the tax payers or the politicians or their sycophants who had perpetuated the crime. Whether any departmental action is taken against the bureaucrats who sided with the politicians and tortured a clean officer. Whistle blower protection act is only a show piece legislation just to eye wash.

(Author note: I am also a similar victim. One case is explained in detail in my book “A FRAUD IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION” I issued notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code for compensation at two occasions. But I did not pursue it further.)

Below is the details of the case:

A petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was filed by Dr. Ram Lakhan Singh, an Indian Forest Service Officer who rendered services to the UP State and Government of India in various positions for about 35 years till his retirement.  The main contention of the petitioner was that he was illegally detained by the respondent authorities after implicating him in false vigilance cases and dishonouring the High Court’s directions.  Because of the malicious, wilful and contemptuous acts of the State and clear abuse of legal process, he and his family members had to suffer a great ordeal of mental agony and heavy financial loss besides being defamed in the society. Hence he petitioned to the Supreme Court (he appeared before the SC in person) to express displeasure over the violation of his family members’ fundamental rights and to direct the respondent to pay compensation for the loss of his professional career, reputation and for causing mental agony.

The relevant facts were that he had rendered about 35 years’ service to the State of U.P. and the Government of India, with an unblemished record.  He became a Member of the National Board for Wild Life on 22nd September, 2003.  The then Chief Minister of the respondent State wanted the petitioner to take necessary steps so as to get the Benti Bird Sanctuary located at Kunda of Pratapgarh District de-notified by the NBWL in its meeting held on 15th October, 2003. As the petitioner did not comply with the directions, the then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, in the guise of a complaint by the MLA of his own party against the petitioner, issued directions to the Director General, Vigilance Establishment of the State to initiate a vigilance enquiry against him. Finally he was removed from his post.  The petitioner moved the High Court by Writ Petition No.126 of 2004 to declare that the vigilance enquiry against him was done in clear violation of the prescribed procedure.  The High Court by orders dated 30th January, 2004 and 14th September, 2007 directed the State Vigilance Committee to carry out the enquiry proceedings, but the respondent did not comply with the directions of the High Court. Thereafter also he was harassed by way of filing PIL and FIR against him, raiding his house, arresting him, suspending him etc. He was finally discharged from the Court proceedings, the petitioner had written a letter to the Chief Minister seeking an amount of Rs.4½ crores towards compensation and damages. 

Finally the SC has held “this Court is reluctant in determining or granting any compensation while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, but advises the parties to approach the competent Courts for adjudicating those issues.  However, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and taking into consideration the age and trauma suffered by the petitioner who spent about 11 days in jail and fought the legal battle for about a period of 10 years before various forums and more particularly in the absence of any proved charges of corruption against the petitioner, we deem it fit that a lump sum amount of Rs.10 lakhs be awarded as compensation to the petitioner on all forms. Accordingly, we direct the State of Uttar Pradesh to pay a lump sum of Rs.10 lakhs to the petitioner within a period of three months towards compensation. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.”

Read my book,'A FRAUD IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION'. For details, go to link:

Also read  my other blogs and website:

Friday 30 October 2015


This is an army case, decided by the Supreme Court of India, but the principle involved is equally applicable in civil cases also.

This is a case where it was found that no enquiry whatsoever was conducted by the Commanding Officer at any stage against the appellant in this case as required under the procedure. More importantly, there was nothing on record to suggest that the authority competent had taken into consideration the long service rendered by the appellant, the difficult living conditions and the hard stations at which he had served.

The material facts were not in dispute. It was not in dispute that the appellant had within a period of 12 years of the service suffered as many as four red ink entries. All these entries were awarded to him on account of overstaying leave for a period ranging between 29 days to 66 days.

There was nothing on record to suggest that the nature of the misconduct leading to the award of red ink entries was so unacceptable that the competent authority had no option but to direct his discharge to prevent indiscipline in the force. Also the ASG, did not dispute the fact that many number of other personnel were still in service no matter they have earned four red ink entries on account of overstaying leave. In such cases, the only safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power by the authority would be to ensure that there is an enquiry howsoever summary and a finding about the defence set-up by the individual besides consideration of the factors made relevant under the procedure.

The SC took notice that it was common ground that a red ink entry might be earned by an individual for overstaying leave for one week or for six months. In either case the entry would a red ink entry and would qualify for consideration in the matter of discharge. If two persons who suffer such entries were treated similarly notwithstanding the gravity of the offence being different, it would be unfair and unjust for unequal could not be treated as equal. More importantly, a person who had suffered four such entries on a graver misconduct may escape discharge which another individual who has earned such entries for relatively lesser offences may be asked to go home prematurely. The unfairness in any such situation makes it necessary to bring in safeguards to prevent miscarriage of justice. That was precisely what the procedural safeguards purported to do in this case.

In the result this appeal against a judgment and order dated 14th December 2011 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal succeeded and was allowed by the Supreme Court andt he order of discharge passed against the appellant was set aside. Since the appellant has already crossed the age of superannuation, it was directed that the appellant should be treated to have been in service till the time he would have completed the qualifying service for grant of pension but without back wages. Benefit of continuity of service for all other purpose should, however, be granted to the appellant including pension. Monetary benefits payable to the appellant shall be released expeditiously but not later than four months from the dateof this order.

(Ref.:Supreme Court Judgement dated October 16, 2015 in Veerendra Kumar Dubey V/s Chief of Army Staff & Ors.)


Saturday 17 October 2015


Now Ministry of Finance, GOI, vide Office Memorandum dated 16/10/2015 issued a revised method of pay fixation for those who are promoted in between 1.1.2006 and the date of notification of CCS(RP)Rules, 2008.

This is applicable in cases where promotion took place in the pre-revised pay scale during the period between 1.1.2006 and the date of notification of CCS(RP)Rules, 2008 when the pre-revised and revised pay scales were different and the posts carried the character of feeder and promotional grades,  pay fixation on such promotion shall be allowed under \rule 13 of the CCS(RP) Rules, 2008 with the following conditions:

  1. The promotion had taken place between 1.1.2006 and the date of notification
  2. FR 22(I) (a)(1), which was applicable for fixation of pay on promotion before promulgation of CCS(RP) Rules, 2008
  3. The concerned employees had opted to come over to the revised pay structure from a date occurring prior to the date of notification of CCS(RP) Rules, 2008.
  4. The concerned Recruitment Rules have been amended subsequently to provide for merger of these grades into a single grade/post.
However, this order applies only in case of promotions carried out in the pre-revised structure during 01.01.2006 and the date of notification of CCS(RP) Rules, 2008. Hence, the benefit of Rule 13 of CCS(RP) Rules, 2008 would not apply in cases of appointment to the post which was in the higher pay scale in the pre-revised pay scale, where such appointment is made after the date of notification of CCS(RP) Rules, 2008. 

I think there can be more clarifications in this regard.
For more information, go to the following link:



Wednesday 14 October 2015


GOI,Department of Personnel and Training vide notification dated 12/10/2015 amended the due date for Furnishing of Information and Annual Return of Assets and Liabilities and the Limits for Exemption of Assets in Filing Returns. The new date is 15/04/2016. Details are as follows:

2. In the Public Servants (Furnishing of Information and Annual Return of Assets and Liabilities and the Limits
for Exemption of Assets in Filing Returns) Rules, 2014, in rule 3, in sub-rule (2),-
(a) in the first proviso, for the words and figures "on or before the 15th day of October, 2015", the words and
figures "on or before the 15th day of April, 2016" shall be substituted;
(b) in the second proviso, for the words and figures "on or before the 15th day of October, 2015", the words and
figures "on or before thel5th day of April, 2016" shall be substituted”.

(Author,s Note: This is only for information purpose)


Tuesday 6 October 2015

Procedure for booking of air-tickets on LTC- Clarification

DOPT vide OM. No. 31011/5/2014-Estt (A.IV) dated September 23, 2015 directed to refer its earlier O.M. No. 31011/4/2014-Estt.(A-IV) dated 19th June, 2014 which lays down that the Government employees are required to book the air tickets directly from the airlines (Booking counters, website of airlines) or by utilizing the service of Authorized Travel Agents viz. 'M/s Balmer Lawrie & Company', 'M/s Ashok Travels & Tours' and 'IRCTC' (to the extent IRCTC is authorized as per DoPT O.M. No. 31011/6/2002-Est(A) dated 02.12.2009) while undertaking LTC journey(s). Vide DoPT's O.M. 31011/5/2014-Estt.(AIV) dated 24.09.2014, the web-portal of these authorized travel agents will also be treated as an acceptable mode for purchase of air tickets on LTC subject to the conditions stated vide Department of Expenditure's O.M. No. 19024/1/2012-E-IV dated 5thSeptember, 2014.

It further stated that various Ministries/Departments continue to send references to DoPT seeking relaxation regarding the booking of air tickets for the purpose of LTC from the travel agents not authorised by the aforesaid O.M.. In most of the cases, the common reason stated by the LTC beneficiaries is that they were not aware of the guidelines and inadvertently booked the tickets from other travel agents. 

Therefore, they advised to ensure a wide circulation of the guidelines as stated in para 1 of this O.M.. It was also advised that this point may also be emphasized by the Administration whenever any advance is sought or intention to avail LTC is conveyed by the Government servant. 

Wednesday 23 September 2015


In this appeal the Supreme Court was compelled to wonder whether a Legal forum should allow itself to imagine facts and conceive of perverted situations to brush aside the material brought on record and then for contrived reasons arrive at a conclusion that there was possibly of no embezzlement or personal gain. The first respondent, a conductor in the service of the U.P. State Transport Corporation, despite the fact of carrying 25 passengers without ticket being proved, was relieved and assuaged by substitution of punishment of dismissal with stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect taking aid of Section 6(2-A) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by the Labour court in invocation of the doctrine of reformation and principle of mercy. The High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction has given the stamp of approval to the award by treating it as just and defensible fundamentally resting its conclusion on the foundation that the controversy hinged on the factual score.

The High Court, appreciating the reasons ascribed in the award passed by the Labour Court, came to hold that it had not been proved that the workman concerned had taken fare from 25 passengers and not issued tickets to them and, therefore, there was no embezzlement. Being of this view, the High Court concurred with the award relating to reinstatement but as far as the grant of back wages is concerned, it reduced the same to 25 percentage.

On a perusal of the award passed by the Labour Court as well as the order passed by the High Court, the SC found that a categorical conclusion has been arrived at on the basis of the evidence on record that the respondent who was engaged as a Conductor had allowed 25 passengers to travel in the bus without ticket. It was obvious that the primary and core duty of a conductor was to collect fare and render true and correct account. This was the mainstay and centre piece of his work and faith reposed on him by the employer. The SC further stated that the Labour Court as well as the High Court had been guided by the perception that there was no recovery of money and, therefore, there was no corruption or embezzlement. But it failed to notice the nature of duties and obligation of a conductor. Even the finding on no corruption or embezzlement was ambiguous and contradictory.

SC further added that when a power is conferred on the Labour Court, it was obligatory on it to record satisfaction that the order of dismissal was not justified and thereafter proceeded to award a lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal. The thrust of the matter is whether the present case was one where a lenient attitude was required to be shown by the Labour Court and the High Court. In the instant case, as accepted by the Labour Court, the first respondent was carrying 25 passengers without tickets which had caused financial loss to the Corporation. That apart, the workman had also violated the postulates under the Rule and committed misconduct. Two aspects were absolutely clear.

Finally it was held by the SC that on a mere glance at the said reasons are really imaginary and reveal some kind of unacceptable theoretical perceptions by the Labour Court.

Consequently, the award passed by the Labour Court as well as the order passed by the High Court was set aside and the order of dismissal imposed by the Corporation is restored.

(Reference: Judgement of SC dated September 1, 2015 in CIVIL APPEAL NO.2038 OF 2012) 

Monday 21 September 2015


In a landmark judgement of the Supreme Court of India dated September 09, 2015 in Civil Appeal no. 9165-72/09, held that the respondents cannot take the benefit of the delay caused by them. Thereby it approved single bench decision of the High Court and reversed Division Bench order.

The admitted facts of the case was that in the State of U.P. a set of rules were existed namely, the Uttar Pradesh Absorption of Retrenched Employees of Government or Public Corporations in Government Service Rules, 1991. After the Corporation was wound up, the employees of the U.P. State Cement Corporation Limited Corporation, filed Writ Petition seeking absorption under the aforesaid Rules.

The Single Judge hearing the writ petition referred to Rule 3(i) of the Rules that deals with the rights of the retrenched employees. He referred to the dictionary clause engrafted in Rule 2(c), which reads as follows: “2(c) Retrenched employees means a person who was appointed on the post under the Govt. or a public corporation on or before Oct., 1, 1986 in accordance with the procedure laid down for recruitment to the post and was continuously working in any post under the Government or such Corporation up to the date of his retrenchment. Due to reduction in, or winding up of, any establishment of the Government or the Corporation, as the case may be and in respect of whom a certificate of being a retrenched employee has been issued by this appointing authority.”
After reproducing the said provision, the High Court referred to the order passed in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.17195 of 1998, and reproduced the relevant paragraphs from the decision rendered therein and, thereafter, took note of the fact that the said order had been affirmed in Special Appeal No.540 of 1999, and further stood confirmed by the SC, for the appeal preferred before the Supreme Court did not meet with success. The learned Single Judge also referred to the order passed in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 38534 of 2001 on 20th September, 2003, wherein a direction was issued to the respondent No.2 to take appropriate decision. After the said direction was issued, the Principal Secretary (Personnel), Government of U.P., rejected the claims of the petitioners therein on the foundation that the Personnel Department did not have the authority to declare the employees as retrenched employees and to take a decision for their absorption. The learned Single Judge dealt with various contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and also cogitated upon the U.P. Absorption of Retrenched Employees of the State Government/Public Sector Corporation in Government Service (Recession) Rules, 2003 and, eventually held that the Absorption Rules, 1991 were rescinded on 8th April, 2003 and much prior to that the employees had represented and the respondents were required to consider their rights for absorption within two months and regard being had to the rule position, it could safely be held that the rights of the employees had crystallized much before the Rules were rescinded. After so holding, the learned Single Judge proceeded to state, “The respondents cannot take the benefit of the delay caused by them in considering petitioners application. The two months period granted by this Court on 20.09.2002 expired on 20.11.2002. The delay made by the Secretary (Karmik) Anubhag-2, Government of U.P. in deciding the matter, cannot be a ground to refuse the due consideration, required to be made by this Court before the rescission of the Rules. The Rescission of Rules will, therefore, not come in the way of petitioners in claiming the absorption. The writ petition, as such, allowed. The impugned order dated 30.04.2003 passed by the Special Secretary (Karmik) Anubhag-3, Govt. of U.P., Lucknow (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) is quashed. The respondents are directed to absorb the petitioners in any vacancy on Group-C post outside the purview of Public Service Commission within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.”

The aforesaid order was assailed before a Special Bench in Special Appeal No.618 of 2004 and the Division Bench of the High Court reversed the Single Bench decision.

However, the Supreme Court disapproved the Division Bench decision and upheld the decision of Single Bench with the following words indicating what is happening in the Courts in India: “In the obtaining factual matrix, we are disposed to think that it was absolutely inappropriate on the part of the High Court to go in search of ratio of the judgment rendered by the Single Judge on the earlier occasion, when the controversy had really been put to rest by this court. The Division Bench, we are disposed to think, should not have entered the arena which was absolutely unwarranted. The decision rendered by this Court inter se parties was required to be followed in the same fact situation. When the factual matrix was absolutely luminescent and did not require any kind of surgical dissection, there was no necessity to take a different view. Needless to say, this kind of situation procrastinate the litigations and the litigants,… is extremely expensive and time consuming.”

In this regard, SC had quoted from an earlier decision, “One must remember that pursuit of the law, however glamorous it is, has its own limitation on the Bench. In a multi-Judge court, the Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority.”

Finally, it was held that in view of the aforesaid analysis, they could not find any reason why the appellants therein should not reap the benefits of absorption and, accordingly, it was directed that they should be absorbed by the State Government as per their seniority and be given the benefit of increments, within eight weeks. SC also ordered that they would be entitled to their seniority as per the prevalent rules. If anyone hds been retired from service, he should also get the retirement benefits inclusive of pension.

[Reference: SC., CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9165-9172 OF 2009 Sunil Kumar Verma and Others Appellant(s) V/s State of U.P. and Others Respondent(s)]

Thursday 3 September 2015

Supreme Court: Higher qualification automatically would not entitle to the pay-scale of higher post than the post to which one is appointed.

In a case decided by the Supreme Court on September 01, 2015, it was held that  Higher qualification automatically would not entitle to the pay-scale of higher post than the post to which one is appointed.

The appellants in this case had been working for the last 25 years in the respondent Institutions and teaching the students of the college. The reason given by the High Court is that for the purpose of claiming pay-scale at par with the college teachers, the minimum requirement was that one had to clear the State Level Eligibility Test. In Supreme Court's view, that condition would not apply so far the appellants were concerned as because on the date when they were appointed and transferred to the college there was no requirement for having the qualification of State Level Eligibility Test. The qualification of the candidate was considered at the time of appointment and not after rendering 25 years of service in the college.

 The submission of the State counsel wass that the appellant was only Acharya and, therefore, he could only get the benefit of merger. However, the SC did not accept the submission made by the learned counsel. Further, it was also held that the High Court was not correct in holding that merely because the appellants have higher qualifications would not mean that they automatically become entitled to the pay-scale of higher post than the post to which they were appointed. The ratio decided in the case of State of Haryana vs. Kamal Shahrawat will not apply in the facts of the present case for the simple reason that the appellants have been serving in the college as a lecturer for the last 25 years

After  considering the matter, SC was of the view that in the special facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellants were entitled to get the pay-scale at par with the teachers of the respondent college inasmuch as they had been discharging the same duties and  also possessing the required qualification. However, the SC has made it clear this order would not create a precedent.

[Reference: Gurdas Singh and others etc. v/s State of Punjab and others (SC ) CIVIL APPEAL Nos.6691-6692 OF 2015 Decided on 01/09/2015 ]

Monday 31 August 2015


Below placed is an OFFICE MEMORANDUM issued by DOPT vide F. No. 11013/08/2013-Estt(A-III) Dated August 31, 2015 on the above subject. It is an age old instruction.

The funny part of the OM is that contravention of the instruction is treated as misconduct under the conduct rules. But if the higher authority does not take any action, either forwarding or rejecting by informing the employee, there is not misconduct. So the provision is simply made to hush up the matter from the notice of the higher authorities. In my case this had happened in many occasions. This is well explained in my book ‘A FRAUD IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION’ in the chapter named ‘Whistle blower charge sheeted’. This may happen to anybody in any Government Office. So what is the use of making a representation if no action is taken on it?

Now go to the body of the OM:

“Subject: Representation from Government servant on service matters - reiteration of instructions - regarding.

The undersigned is directed to refer to O.M. of even number dated 6th June, 2013 wherein instructions have been issued on submission of representation by Government servants about their service matters. In spite of these instructions, it has been observed that Government servants including officers/ officials of para military forces and Army personnel continue to represent directly to the Prime Minister, Minister, Secretary (P) and other higher authorities, directly.

2. As per the existing instructions, wherever, in any matter connected with his service rights or conditions, a Government servant wishes to press a claim or to seek redressal of a grievance, the proper course for him is to address his immediate official superior, or Head of his office, or such other authority at the appropriate level who is competent to deal with the matter in the organisation.
3. Such submission of representations directly to other authorities by- passing the prescribed channel of communication, has to be viewed seriously and appropriate disciplinary action should be taken against those who violate these instructions. This can rightly be treated as an unbecoming conduct attracting the provisions of Rule 3 (1) (iii) of the Central Chill Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. It is clarified that this would include all forms of communication including through e-mails or public grievances portal etc.

4. Attention in this connection is also invited to the provision of Rule 20 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 prohibiting Government servants from bringing outside influence in respect of matter pertaining to his service matter. Representation by relatives of Government servant is also treated as outside influence as clarified vide MHA OM No. F. 25/21/63-Estt.(A) dated 19.09.1963

5. It is reiterated that these instructions may be brought to the notice of all Govt servants including officers/ officials of para military forces and member of armed forcesand action taken against those who violate these instructions.”


Sunday 30 August 2015


It is held by the Supreme Court that in the absence of any provision for consequential seniority in the rules, the ‘catch up rule’ would be applicable and the roster-point reserved category promotees cannot count their seniority in the promoted category from the date of their promotion and the senior general candidates if later reached the promotional level, general candidates would regain their seniority. By reversing the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, Supreme Court held that the Division Bench appeared to have proceeded on an erroneous footing that Article 16 (4A) of the Constitution of India automatically gives the consequential seniority in addition to accelerated promotion to the roster-point promotees and hence the judgment of the Division Bench could not be sustained.

As a result, the judgment of the Madras High Court was set aside by the SC and the appeals were allowed. State Government-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were directed to revise the seniority list of Assistant Divisional Engineers applying the ‘catch up rule’ within four months. It was ordered that pursuant to the judgment ofthe Division Bench of Madras High Court, if any further promotion had been granted to the Assistant Divisional Engineers promoted from the rank of Junior Engineers following rule of reservation with consequential seniority, the same should be reversed. Further promotion of Assistant Divisional Engineers should be as per the revised seniority list.

(Reference: CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6631-6632 of 2015 GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU
AND ANR. ETC.ETC. V/s. V. VIVEKANANDAN & ORS. ETC.decided on August 27, 2015)

Saturday 22 August 2015


In a decision of the Supreme Court on 21/08/2015, it was held that for the purpose of denying promotion, all adverse ACRs to be communicated to the concerned persons. In its absence, the entire process was held to be invalid. This is a very interesting story to know how and to what extent a person could be harassed.

(NB:- I was also subjected to similar harassment. My story is now to be published as a book on 24/8/2015 in a public meeting.)

The brief facts of the case are as below :-

The dispute in this case arose when a letter dated 28.06.2000 was received by the appellant in this case before the Supreme Court, wherein the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) for the period 1.07.1999 to 31.03.2000 was rated his performance as ‘average’. This led to a representation dated 07.07.2000 before the DGP-cum-Commandant General, requesting the supply of documents on the basis of which his conduct and diligence was graded as ‘average’. But no satisfactory response was received by the appellant despite having been made reminder representations dated 18.08.2000 and 25.08.2000 for supply of the said documents. Rest of the facts are already covered the operative part of the judgement.

After hearing both the parties and considering the facts and rival legal contentions urged by them including the written submissions, and on perusal of record, the has stated that the promotion of the appellant to the post of Battalion Commander from the post of District Commandant was governed by Rule 8(1)(2)(i). The aforesaid rule contemplates that 75% of the promotional posts of the Battalion Commander be filled up by promotion amongst the Battalion second in command. The legal requirement for promotion to the post of Battalion Commander is that the claimant should have been working as a District Commandant for a period of 8 years and the appointment to the said promotional post shall be made by the Competent Authority on seniority -cum- merit basis. No person shall be entitled to claim promotion on the basis of seniority alone. As per the Punjab State Government Instructions issued on 06.09.2001, certain guidelines have been laid down for DPC to consider the cases of promotion to the post of Class-I and Class-II namely, group ‘A’ and ‘B’ posts. As per the said guidelines, an eligible candidate is promoted on the basis of the seniority-cum-merit criteria, where merit is determined on the basis of benchmark awarded to the various aspects contained in the ACR of the officer, wherein marks are awarded against such entries made in the ACRs of the officers concerned for the relevant period.

Further, as per the records obtained by the appellant from the respondents under the RTI Act at the time of his claim for promotion to the post of Battalion Commander was first considered, his ACRs from year 1996 were considered. The Instructions dated 29.12.2000 would be applicable prospectively to the ACRs of the appellant for relevant periods which were prepared after those Instructions were issued. According to the Instructions, officers obtaining 0-14 marks out of a total of 20 marks would be graded over all ‘Good’. Thus, the appellant was entitled to promotion as he had been awarded 10 marks as per the proceedings of DPC.

The High Court in the impugned judgment further observed that the final reporting authority had downgraded the appellant as an ‘average’ officer for the above relevant period. As per the executive Instructions dated 10.01.1985 issued by the State Government, the Commandant General is the final Authority for the rank of the District Commander. That being the factual position, the downgrading of the performance of the appellant in his ACR for the above relevant period by the respondent No. 4 was not valid as the same was done without any authority and competence. The adverse entries in the ACR have deprived the appellant of his right of promotion to the post in question and therefore, the said adverse entries in the ACRs against the appellant are not legal and valid.

A perusal of the ACR for the period 2000-2001 reveals that though the general remarks stated that “He is very good and responsible officer” respondent No. 4 had given a grade which read, “I agree. An average officer”. The said entry shows that he had agreed to all the remarks of the ACR given in respect of columns 1 to 18 for that year by the Competent Accepting Authority, but he further stated assessed the officer to be an ‘average’ officer without assigning any reason whatsoever apart from his competence to make such adverse entries. The overall grading of the ACR is based upon the observations made by the Reporting Authority, Reviewing Authority and final Accepting Authority. As per the entries made by the respondent No. 4, he had agreed to the overall grading as given by the Accepting Authority. In such a case, he could not have downgraded the overall grading in the ACR by using the words “an average officer”. Further, if the comments made on 20.05.2004 by the respondent No. 4 on the ACR for the year 2000-2001 are being sought to justify the stand of denial of promotion to the appellant to the post in question, then the clarification needs to take effect from that date, i.e 20.05.2004. In such a case, the appellant was to be assigned 3nmarks as per the instructions for the year 2003, when he was ignored for the promotion for the first time.

The SC further stated that a perusal of the copy of the ACR for the period 2003-2004 reflects a true picture of the injustice that has been perpetrated against the appellant. The ACR has been written by Mr. Tejinder Singh, respondent No. 4 who was the Reporting Authority as the Divisional Commandant. The very same officer was also the Reviewing Authority as Deputy Commandant General. Further, the same officer also happened to be the Final Accepting Authority as the Commandant General, as is evident from his comment dated 30.09.2004. The fact that in the said year also the performance of the appellant had been graded as ‘average’ clearly reveals the malafide intention of the respondent nos.1-4 in deliberately denying the promotion to the appellant to the post in question. According to the respondents themselves, the executive Instructions dated 06.09.2001 have not been superseded by any other Instructions or rules framed by the competent authority. If these illegal downgrading entries in the ACR for the relevant period are ignored, then the appellant would attain 14 marks. As per the Instructions dated 06.09.2001, 12 marks were required for promotion to the post as per the benchmark fixed. Further, the adverse remarks for the period 1999-2000 were conveyed to appellant vide communication dated 28.06.2000 by the D.G.P-cum Commandant General. The representations dated 18.08.2000 and 25.08.2000 made by the appellant against the same were submitted to respondent No. 4. The said representation was rejected on 07.05.2001. The appellant had challenged the same by filing Civil Suit No. 70 of 2001, wherein the respondent No. 4 was impleaded as defendant No. 3. The civil suit was decreed on 15.03.2002 in favour of the appellant. The said judgment and decree passed in favour of the appellant has not been implemented by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, despite having attained finality, which clearly reflects the fact that the respondent No.4 was not fair in considering him for promotion to the post of Battalion Commander as provided under Rule 8(2) of the Rules. According to the Rules, the appointment to the promotional post shall be made on seniority-cum-merit basis. As per the ACRs placed on record, the appellant has fulfilled the aforesaid requirement of seniority-cum-merit by securing 14 marks, as per the Instructions in relation to all aspects entered in the ACR. Thestrong reliance placed upon the adverse remarks made by the respondent No.4, who has made the same without assigning any reasons, has resulted in the appellant being denied of the promotional benefit, even though the order of the respondent No. 4 was set aside by the judgment and decree in Civil Suit no. 70 of 2001. The action of respondent No. 4 in denying the promotional benefit to the appellant is tainted with malafides. It can further be observed from the record that it was respondent no.7 who had filed the reply on behalf of all the respondents in the writ petition proceedings before the High Court. It is important to note at this stage that respondent No. 7 happens to be an officer junior to the appellant, who was promoted to the post in question. The non-filing of written statement by respondent No. 4 traversing the allegations of malafide against him proves the malafide intention on part of the respondent No. 4. Therefore, there was no justification for the respondent No. 4 in denying the promotional benefit to the post of Battalion Commander to the appellant. SC also referred to an earlier case where it was held that if the ACR of the officer concerned is to be used for the purpose of denying promotion, then all such ACRs were required to be communicated to him, to enable him to make a representation against his adverse entries made in the ACRs.

As per the record submitted by the respondents, the appellant was given grade ‘A+’ for the year 2001-2002, but only 1 mark was assigned. According to the executive Instructions, the grade ‘A+’ is to be assigned 4 marks. Accordingly, if 4 marks are assigned for the ACR of the appellant for the period 2001-2002, then he would have scored 12 marks at the time of consideration for promotion in the year 2003, whereas admittedly, the appellant was required to achieve only 10 marks in order to be promoted to the post of Battalion Commander. Hence, if the calculation of marks made by the respondents on the various aspects in the ACR of the appellant is believed to be true, then also he has achieved the required benchmark. The action of the respondent No. 4 in deliberately ignoring the claim of the appellant is vitiated in law as the same is contrary to the Rules and records of ACR for the relevant period and Instructions issued by the State Government laying down certain guiding principles.

Therefore, the SC stated that the order of denial of promotion to the appellant, which had been affirmed by the High Court in its judgment and order passed in the Writ Petition and Review Application was liable to be set aside.

For the reasons stated above, the SC passed the following order:-

“(1) We set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in both the Civil Writ Petition and the Review Application and also the order of denying the promotional benefit by the respondents-Department to the post of the Battalion Commander from the year 2001-2002;

(2) Further, we direct the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 to reconsider the claim of the appellant in the light of our findings and reasons recorded on the contentious factual and legal aspects so that he could get higher post of Battalion Commander notionally to get pensionary benefits as he has been prematurely retired from service on 31.7.2007; and

(3) The said direction shall be complied with within 8 weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of this order and for the purpose of fixing his pensionary benefits and other monetary benefits for which he is legally entitled to and submit the compliance report to this Court.

The appeal is allowed in the above said terms with cost of Rs.10,000/- payable to the appellant by respondent Nos. 1 to 4.”

[ Reference:- CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6532 OF 2015 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) NO. 1640 of 2014) DALJIT SINGH GREWAL Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS (SC) dated August 21, 2015]

Saturday 8 August 2015


The Gov. of India, Ministry of Finance Vide OM no. 21(2)/2015-E.II(B) dated 6th August, 2015 revised the Transport Allowance to Central Government Employees with effect from 1st April 2015. The rates are given below. For new classification of cities, refer to my earlier post dated 29th July, 2015.

Wednesday 5 August 2015


In a decision dated July 31, 2015 of the Supreme Court of India, it was held that the principle “NO WORK NO PAY” IS NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THE EMPLOYER IS AT FAULT for delay. In this case, the order of the High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No.6466 of 2002 dated 02.12.2004 was challenged whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed against the order of denial of pay and allowances to the appellant for the period from 01.08.1997 till the date of his actual promotion i.e. 13.11.2000 and also the order dated 18.03.2005 dismissing the Review Application No.55 of 2005.

Background facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as under:- The appellant got enrolled in the Indian Army on the post of Store Keeper Technical/Sepoy on 19.03.1983 and was subsequently promoted to the rank of Havildar on 01.08.1989. While the appellant was so working, a Summary Court Martial (SCM) for the offences under Sections 41(i), 39 (a) and 63 of the Army Act was initiated against him. After completion of the inquiry and on proved charges by an order dated 03.06.1992, the appellant was sentenced to:- (i) reduction in rank; (ii) dismissal from service and (iii) rigorous imprisonment for one year in civil prison. Aggrieved by the Order passed in Summary Court Martial, the appellant preferred a statutory complaint under Section 164 of the Army Act. The Central Government vide Order dated 17.08.1994 commuted the punishment modifying it to one of severe reprimand and further remitted the sentence of dismissal from service directing reinstatement in service. However, it was held that the appellant was not entitled to any pay and allowances for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement in service. In compliance with the Order passed by the Central Government, the appellant was reinstated in service w.e.f. 29.10.1994. The appellant was again put to Summary Court Martial for committing offence under Section 54(b) of the Army Act and by an Order dated 18.02.1995; the appellant was awarded severe reprimand/red ink entry for the offence of loosing identity card.

Case of the appellant for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar came up for consideration before Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) on 01.08.1997; but the appellant was not considered for promotion and according to the respondents, the appellant did not meet the discipline criteria for promotion as the appellant was having two red ink entries during preceding five years. On appellant’s repeated representations for his promotion as per his seniority, finally his claim was considered by the DPC held on 15.03.2000 and he was granted promotion w.e.f. 01.01.2000 with ante-dated seniority w.e.f. 01.08.1997 along with his batchmates. However, no direction was issued regarding any pay and allowances to the appellant in the higher rank of Naib Subedar from the back date; but his seniority was maintained from 01.08.1997 when his batchmates have been promoted. Aggrieved by the order of the DPC, denying pay and allowances in the promotional post for the period between 01.08.1997 to 13.11.2000, the appellant filed W.P.(C) No.6466 of 2002 before the High Court of Delhi. Vide impugned order dated 02.12.2004, the High Court dismissed the writ petition observing that the appellant has no legitimate claim for payment of pay and allowances from a retrospective date on the principle of “no work no pay”. The Review Application No.55 of 2005 also came to be dismissed on 18.03.2005. In this appeal the correctness of the above orders passed in the writ petition and also the review application was challenged.

Contention of the appellant was that subsequently when the fresh DPC was held on 15.03.2000, the appellant was declared fit for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar w.e.f. 01.01.2000 with ante-dated seniority w.e.f. 01.08.1997 and while so, the appellant was arbitrarily deprived from getting pay and allowances and other benefits from 01.08.1997 and hence the appellant was entitled to get his pay and allowances for the period from 01.08.1997 till the date of his actual promotion on 13.11.2000. It was submitted that the respondents erroneously denied pay and allowances to the appellant when they themselves have granted him ante-dated seniority w.e.f. 01.08.1997.

The respondents contended that although the order imposing punishment on the appellant was passed by the Summary Court Martial on 03.06.1992 but the same was commuted only on 17.08.1994 and therefore the period of five years was rightly counted w.e.f. 17.08.1994 and therefore the appellant was not eligible to be considered for promotion prior to 17.08.1999. It was further submitted that on 01.08.1997, when the appellant’s case came up for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar, he did not meet the criteria for promotion as he had incurred two red ink entries during preceding five years and rightly the appellant was not given the pay and allowances from 01.08.1997 which benefit was given to him w.e.f. 13.11.2000 when he actually joined the said rank of Naib Subedar, but to avoid any injustice, his seniority was maintained from 01.08.1997 along with his batch mates.

As per the policy of the respondents, an individual cannot be considered for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar, if he has earned more than three red ink entries during the entire service and more than one red ink entry in the preceding five years of service. It is noticeable that when the case of the appellant came up for consideration on 01.08.1997, the first punishment/red ink entry had already expired i.e. on 03.06.1997 and only one red ink entry made on 18.02.1995 was on the record; but the DPC appears to have erred in ignoring the same. Considering the genuineness of the representations made by the appellant, DPC again considered the claim of the appellant and granted him promotion w.e.f. 01.01.2000 to the rank of Naib Subedar with a further direction that the seniority of the appellant will be maintained alongwith his batchmates from 01.08.1997. When appellant was granted ante-dated seniority w.e.f. 01.08.1997 alongwith his batchmates, we find no reason as to why he should be denied pay and allowances in the promotional post as Naib Subedar w.e.f. 01.08.1997 till the date of his actual promotion on 13.11.2000. The High Court has not properly appreciated these aspects and erred in holding that on 01.08.1997, the appellant was not eligible to be considered for promotion. When the respondents themselves have taken the view that the Order of the Government would be deemed to have taken from the date ofmoriginal sentence was passed i.e. 03.06.1992 and not from 17.08.1994, the date on which commutation/remission was granted by the Government, the High Court was not right in holding that the appellant was not eligible to be considered for promotion on 01.08.1997 and the impugned order cannot be sustained.

The respondents argued that the denial of pay and allowances was on the principle of “no work no pay” and no injustice had been done to the appellant since he had not actually worked in the promotional post of Naib Subedar during the aforesaid period. It was also submitted that the benefit of pay and allowances was rightly awarded w.e.f. 13.11.2000, the date on which the appellant actually assumed the rank of Naib Subedar but his seniority was maintained so as to protect his interest in his further promotions.

However, the Supreme Court even stated that, in the absence of a statutory provision, normal rule is “no work no pay”. In appropriate cases, a court of law may take into account all, the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The principle of “no work no pay” would not be attracted where the respondents were in fault in not considering the case of the appellant for promotion and not allowing the appellant to work on a post of Naib Subedar carrying higher pay scale. In the facts of the present case when the appellant was granted promotion w.e.f. 01.01.2000 with the ante-dated seniority from 01.08.1997 and maintaining his seniority along with his batch mates, it would be unjust to deny him higher pay and allowances in the promotional position of Naib Subedar.

Hence, the SC set aside the impugned orders passed by the High Court and the appeal was allowed with order that the respondents should release the arrears of pay and allowances to the appellant for the period from 01.08.1997 till the date of his actual promotion that is 13.11.2000 in the promotional post of Naib Subedar within eight weeks from the date of judgement.

(Ref: Supreme Court CIVIL APPEAL NO. 811 OF 2007 RAMESH KUMAR ...Appellant Versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Respondents decided on July 31, 2015)

Thursday 30 July 2015


Government of India, DOPT sent to various authorities Vide letter No. 1/5/2011-IR Dated 10thJuly, 2015 expressing the need for Harmonization of RTI (Fee & Cost) Rules and Appeal Procedure Rules under Right to Information Act, 2005.

Earlier, the Government of India had notified a set of RTI Rules, 2012 dated 31.7.2012. While drafting the RTI Rules, 2012, it was stipulated that once notified, the State Governments would be requested to adopt these rules as it is, so that there might be uniformity in the matter of implementation of the RTI Act throughout the country. However,few States have not yet harmonized their fee rules with that of the Central Government.

Therefore, in the latest letter it is requested by the Central Government to various authorities mentioned in the letter to review their Right to Information (Fee & Cost Rules) and Appeal Procedure Rules.


Government of India, DOPT (Establishment Division) vide office memorandum F. No. 11013/8/2015-Estt.A-111 Dated July 27th, 2015 issued instructions regarding requirement of taking prior permission for leaving station/ headquarters for going abroad while on leave. This is in line with the existing instructions.
1. When a Government servant applies for leave for going abroad on a private visit, separately prior permission of the competent authority for such visit is also required. The requests of Government servants for such permission are to be dealt with expeditiously.

2. It has been decided that requests for permission for private visits abroad may be processed in the attached formats. In the event of failure on the part of the competent authority to communicate its decision to the Government employee concerned with 21 days of receipt of the application, the employee concerned shall be free to assume that permission has been granted to him.

Monday 27 July 2015


In a recent judgement of the Supreme Court dated 02-7-2015, it was held that contractual employees cannot seek regularization with retrospective effect when regularisation policy was not in vogue

Facts of the case: The appellants were initially engaged on the post of Assistant Manager (Civil) by the respondent No.1–Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority on contractual basis for a period of 89 days. Initial appointments of the appellants were not made against any sanctioned posts.
However, their engagement continued from time to time, and the appellants have been continuously working on the said post. On 20.11.2002, the respondent authorities published an advertisement for engagement to the posts of Assistant Manager (Civil). The appellants and similarly situated persons who have been engaged on contractual basis filed a Writ seeking for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent-authorities to regularise their services on the post of Assistant Manager (Civil) and to quash the aforesaid advertisement dated 20.11.2002. The appellants contended that as they were working continuously, the respondent authorities instead of issuing a fresh advertisement should have regularised their services on the said post. By the judgment dated 28.09.2005, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the advertisement dated 20.11.2002 and directed the respondent-authorities to consider the claim of the appellants for regularisation of their services on the existing vacancies which were directed to be filled up from the existing contractual employees as per the Regulation/Rules and fresh advertisement could be issued inviting applications from the general candidates only for remaining vacancies. Challenging the order of the learned single Judge, respondent authorities filed Special Appeal before the Division Bench.

Pending adjudication of Writ Petition before the single Judge, a scheme for regularization of the contractual employees was formulated wherein a policy was framed regarding regularization of 27 contractual employees who had been engaged initially for a period of 89 days and continued thereafter. The State Government, vide its letter dated 05.03.2008, approved the policy formulated by respondent No.1 for regularization of contractual employees. Pursuant to the policy decision, the appellants and other similarly situated contractual employees were appointed on the post of Assistant Manager (Civil) vide appointment orders dated 06.08.2010.

After joining the said post, the appellants filed a Claim Petition No. 174 of 2011 before the State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow praying for regularization of their services from the date of existence of vacancies, that is 20.11.2002, the date on which the advertisement was issued, for appointment to the post of Assistant Manager (Civil) and with all consequential benefits. The tribunal, vide its judgment dated 23.06.2011, allowed the Claim Petition and directed the authorities to consider the appellants’ claim for regularization of their services on the existing vacancies with effect from 20.11.2002. Aggrieved by the order of the tribunal, the respondent authorities preferred a writ being Writ Petition

before the High Court. The High Court, vide judgment dated 29.10.2013 relying on the
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Uma Devi’s case (supra) allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondent authorities and quashed the order dated 23.06.2011 passed by the tribunal granting benefits to the appellants with retrospective effect. Additionally, the High Court also quashed the appointments of the appellants dated 06.08.2010 as ex-facie illegal and directed the authorities to initiate proceedings in respect of illegal appointments which were made in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution ofIndia.

After considering the facts of the case Supreme Court held that the Division Bench was not right in setting aside the appointment of the appellants particularly when nobody challenged the appointment of the appellants. Since the appointment of the appellants were made pursuant to the policy of regularization, the High Court was not right in quashing the appointment of the appellants as the same were never in question before the High Court. The plea that was raised by the appellants was only to seek regularization with retrospective effect from 20.11.2002 and the consequential seniority.
The SC further held that the appellants were appointed on the post of Assistant Manager (Civil) only pursuant to the policy decision of the respondents for regularisation of contractual employees and thus, the appellants cannot seek for regularization with retrospective effect from 20.11.2002, that is when the advertisement was issued, because at that time regularisation policy was not in vogue. By policy of regularisation, it was intended to give the benefit only from the date of appointment. The Court cannot read anything into the policy decision which is plain and unambiguous. Having accepted the appointment orders dated 6.08.2010 and also joined the post, the appellants cannot turn round and claim regularisation with retrospective effect.

With this, the judgment of the High Court quashing the appointment of the appellants vide appointment order dated 06.08.2010 was set aside. Also the appellants’ plea for regularization with retrospective effect was declined. [Reference:- Supreme Court decision dated July 2, 2015 in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4916 OF 2015 SURENDRA KUMAR & ORS. …APPELLANT (S) V/S GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIALnDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. …RESPONDENT (S)]

Friday 24 July 2015


On 17/07/2015, Department of Expenditure has issued an OM no.12(21)/E.Coord/2015 to its employees with the subject ‘Execss Expenditure Over Voted Grants’. This is not a new OM but it is being issued every year just before or during the Parliament session but never followed by anybody. I doubt whether those who are processing the OM itself is properly reading it or not.
It is simply quoting the Public Accounts Committee para 12 of its 36th report on action taken by the government on their observations/recommendations contained in the seventh report (15th Lok Sabha) on “Excess over Voted Grants and Charged Appropriations (2007-08) to the effect that no firm measures have been put in place by the Ministries/Departments concerned to avoid excess expenditure by the defaulter ministries. The OM also invited a reference to Rule 52(1) of the GFRs. The issue of such an OM is in vogue since the time GFR (General Financial Rules) came into existence. But who cares.
Now the funniest part of the Office Memorandum: In this monsoon session of the Parliament, Finance Minister already prepared to seek approval for a supplementary Grant to finance a package to the public sector banks floating on the Non-Performing Assets (NPA). In this background, my first question is whether the burden of NPA is a spontaneous incident noticed by the Finance Ministry after the last Budget session of the Parliament which necessitated for supplementary grant in the monsoon Session? If not, why it was not included in the Budget? When the Minister itself does not honour the rules and regulations, how they can control the subordinates? This is only one instance. Almost all supplementary requests if analysed would come to this category. Second question is, how many M.P.s are utilizing their grants fully or at least substantially during the financial year so that it is not lapsed?
( To read my various other blogs, visit my web site – and my book:


The Government of India, reclassified the status of cities and towns by its office memorandum no.2/5/2014-E.II(B) dated 21/07/2015 for the purpose of House Rent Allowance (HRA) for its employees. Details are given below:

Wednesday 15 July 2015


In this case, the respondent Indian Air Force employee was rendered ineligible for further promotion and thereby invalidated on the ground of his being in medical category A4 G4 (Permanent). In the absence of any specific note on record as to the respondent suffering from any disease prior to his joining the service, he is presumed to have been in sound physical and mental condition while entering service as per Rule 5(a) of the Entitlement Rules.

The fact remains that the respondent employee was denied promotion on medical grounds and the deterioration in his health should therefore be presumed to have been caused due to service in the light of Rule 5(b) of the Entitlement Rules. Moreover, simply recording a conclusion that the disability was not attributable to service, without giving a reason as to why the diseases were not deemed to be attributable to service, clearly shows lack of proper application of mind by the Medical Board.

In these circumstances, the view taken by the Medical Board was rejected by the Supreme Court. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of above Rules and Regulations as well as settled principles of law, SC of the considered opinion that the Tribunal had not committed any error in awarding disability pension to the respondent for 60% disability from the date of his discharge along with 10% p.a. interest on the arrears. For all the reasons stated above, SC did not find any merit in the  appeal of the Union of India and dismissed the appeal directing the appellants to release the arrears of disability pension to the respondent within three months from today together with interest @10% p.a.


Monday 6 July 2015

GOI now issued Office Memorandum dated 03/07/2015 on: Suspension Order should not extend beyond three months - Supreme Court

Kindly refer to my earlier posting of May 2015 on the same subject regarding a direction of the Supreme Court to the Government to issue instructions regarding timely completion of the disciplinary proceedings including suspension. Now the Government of India, Department of Personnel & Training issued the order vide OFFICE MEMORANDUM F. No. 11012/17/2013-Estt.(A) Dated July 3rd , 2015 as follows:-
“Subject: Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 — instructions regarding timely issue of Charge-sheet - regarding.
........ in a recent case, AjayKumar Choudhary vs Union of India Civil Appeal No. 1912 of 2015 dated 16/02/2015 the Apex Court has directed as follows: We, therefore, direct that the currency of Suspension Order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the Memorandum of Charges/ Chargesheet is not served on the delinquent officer/ employee;

2. It is noted that in many cases charge sheets are not issued despite clear prima facie evidence of misconduct on the ground that the matter is under investigation by an investigating agency like Central Bureau of Investigation etc. In the aforesaid judgement the Hon'ble Supreme Court has superseded the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance.

3. In this connection, attention is invited to this Department O.M. No. 35014/1 /81-Estt A dated 9.11.1982 which contained the guidelines for timely issue of charge-sheet to Charged officer and to say that these instructions lay down, inter-alia, that where a Government servant is placed under suspension on the ground of "Contemplated"disciplinary proceedings, the existing instructions provide that every effort would be made to finalise the charges, against the Government servant within three months of the date of suspension. If these instructions are strictly adhered to, a Government servant who is placed under suspension on the ground of contemplated disciplinary proceedings will become aware of the reasons for his suspension without much loss of time. The reasons for suspension should be communicated to the Government servant concerned at the earliest, so that he may be in a position to effectively exercise the right of appeal available to him under Rule 23 (i) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, if he so desires. The time-limit of forty five days for submission of appeal should be counted from the date on which the reasons for suspension arc communicated.”

Thursday 25 June 2015


The case is related to the interpretation of some of the paras of Indian Railway Establishment Manual, 1989 namely paras 180, 189 and 320. It pertains to the preparation of seniority lists and promotion of railway employees from one group to another and from one grade to another within the group. Railway services and in any other Government of India services, have been mainly classified in four groups A, B, C & D. The instant case is concerned with services included in different grades in groups C and D. In each group, there are different grades and the employees working in the lowest grade in one group get promotion to the higher grade within the group. When an employee is in the highest grade in a group, he would get promotion to the higher group and the promotion is given on different criteria. The persons working in a particular grade would be having same pay scale, might be working in different departments or different branches with different qualifications and different nature of work. For the purpose of service conditions and for the purpose of higher promotion, persons belonging to one grade are treated equally.

In the instant case, all 3 respondents were initially working in group D. Out of this, respondent nos.2 and 3 were promoted to a higher post of Pointsman ‘B’ in group C, whereas respondent no.1, who was having the longest service in group D, had not been promoted and therefore, he had approached Central Administrative Tribunal with a grievance that he had been denied benefit of promotion. The Tribunal had directed that the applicant should be considered for promotion on the basis of his seniority.

Aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, Union of India approached the High Court of Kerala. Vide judgment dated 27th November, 2007, the High Court dismissed the Petition filed by the Union of India and hence the present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.
It is an admitted fact that so far as length of service in group D is concerned, respondent no.1 was having longer service than respondent nos.2 and 3. But the question here is whether a person working in one grade of a lower group can get promotion on the basis of his seniority in his group irrespective of the length of service rendered in a particular grade. For example, a person working in the lowest grade i.e. in grade IV would get promotion to grade III, then to grade II and then to grade I. After he has been placed in grade I of group D, he would get promotion to the lowest grade in group C, which is a higher group.

In this case, Respondent no.1 was having longer service in group D but was in a lower grade than respondent nos.2 and 3 in group D service. That is why he was not promoted to a group C post. To be able to get promoted to a post in group C, one must be in the highest grade of group C and admittedly respondent no.1 was not in the highest grade of group C and being in a lower grade than respondent nos.2 and 3, respondent no.1 could not have been promoted along with respondent nos.2 and 3.
Hence the Supreme Court opined that the Tribunal as well as the High Court committed an error while coming to the conclusion that simply because respondent no.1 had a longer service in group D, he should also have been promoted along with respondent nos.2 and 3, who were working in a higher grade in group D.

Therefore, Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court affirming the order of the Tribunal. The Court also directed that according to the provisions of the above stated paras contained in the Manual, the appellants i.e., the Union of India/Railway should prepare different seniority lists for employees working in different grades.

The direction of the Court to the Union of India to prepare different seniority lists for employees working in different grades indicates that the absence of such system created the whole confusion and such a long litigation from Tribunal, High Court, and then to the Supreme court.

(Reference:- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEAL NO.2532 OF 2010 Union of India & Ors. ... Appellants V/s V.K. Krishnan & Ors. ... Respondents, Judgement dated, FEBRUARY 17, 2015.)



The controversy was emerged on account of a reconstitution of cadres. In the first instance, a separate cadre was constituted, out of the existing ministerial cadre, for discharging electronic data processing responsibilities. Again the separate cadre so created, was sought to be re-amalgamated with the existing ministerial cadre. The above noticed bifurcation and re-amalgamation, resulted in a coincidental career advancement, for those who had accepted to break away from the original ministerial cadre. Some of those who were originally placed at inferior positions in the seniority list of the original ministerial cadre, acquired superiority over their counterparts, consequent upon their promotion within the cadre of data entry operators, which resulted in their acquiring a higher position in seniority, over and above those who were senior to them in the original ministerial cadre.

The members of the two cadres were originally discharging similar duties. It is only as a consequence of the administrative decision to computerize the functioning of the Customs and Central Excise Department that a separate cadre of Data Entry Operators came to be created. The newly created cadre, exclusively functioned towards giving effect to the decision to computerize the functioning of the department.

Consequent upon the merger of posts, upon the promulgation of the TA Rules, 2003, and the STA Rules, 2003, the nature and duties of the two cadres were combined. Consequent upon their appointment as Tax Assistants and Senior Tax Assistants, members of the erstwhile ministerial cadre, and members of the cadre of Data Entry Operators, were required to perform both procedural duties and duties relating to computer applications. The deficiencies in the two cadres sought to be merged, were sought to be overcome, by subjecting the members of the two cadres to different examinations, whereby, the two cadres were trained for discharging their duties efficiently, on merger, whilst holding the posts of Tax Assistants/Senior Tax Assistants.

In the above premises, it was held that there was no serious difference between the two merged cadres, either on the issue of nature of duties, or on the subject of powers exercised by the officers holding the post, or the extent of territorial or other charge held, or responsibilities discharged by them, or for that matter, the qualifications prescribed for the posts. Hence it was further held that the merger of the cadres, and the determination of the inter se seniority on merger, were justifiably determined, on the basis of the different pay-scales of the cadres merged, under the TA Rules, 2003 and the STA Rules, 2003. By the mandate of the above Rules, all posts in equivalent pay-scales were placed at the same level. Posts in the higher scale of pay, were given superiority on the subject of inter se seniority, with reference to posts in the lower scale of pay.

In the considered view of the court, the above determination, at the hands of the rule framing authority, on the issue canvassed before them, could not be termed either arbitrary or discriminatory.
Therefore, constitutional validity of the provisions of Rule 4 of the TA Rules, 2003 and Rule 5 of the STA Rules, 2003 were upheld. As a consequence, the different orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal, and the common order dated 13.4.2007 passed by the High Court, were set aside and the appeals filed by those who moved to the cadre of Data Entry Operators from the ministerial cadre, and were thereupon amalgamated in the cadre of Tax Assistants/Senior Tax Assistants, are allowed. The connected appeals preferred by the Union of India, are also allowed.
(Reference:- Supreme Court of India CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2485-2490 OF 2010 in Dhole Govind Sahebrao & others … Appellants V/s Union of India & others … Respondents, decided on  March 26, 2015)