FOR THE PURPOSE OF DENYING PROMOTION, ALL ADVERSE ACRsTO BE COMMUNICATED: SC

In a decision of the Supreme Court on 21/08/2015, it was held that for the purpose of denying promotion, all adverse ACRs to be communicated to the concerned persons. In its absence, the entire process was held to be invalid. This is a very interesting story to know how and to what extent a person could be harassed.

(NB:- I was also subjected to similar harassment. My story is now to be published as a book on 24/8/2015 in a public meeting.)

The brief facts of the case are as below :-

The dispute in this case arose when a letter dated 28.06.2000 was received by the appellant in this case before the Supreme Court, wherein the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) for the period 1.07.1999 to 31.03.2000 was rated his performance as ‘average’. This led to a representation dated 07.07.2000 before the DGP-cum-Commandant General, requesting the supply of documents on the basis of which his conduct and diligence was graded as ‘average’. But no satisfactory response was received by the appellant despite having been made reminder representations dated 18.08.2000 and 25.08.2000 for supply of the said documents. Rest of the facts are already covered the operative part of the judgement.

After hearing both the parties and considering the facts and rival legal contentions urged by them including the written submissions, and on perusal of record, the has stated that the promotion of the appellant to the post of Battalion Commander from the post of District Commandant was governed by Rule 8(1)(2)(i). The aforesaid rule contemplates that 75% of the promotional posts of the Battalion Commander be filled up by promotion amongst the Battalion second in command. The legal requirement for promotion to the post of Battalion Commander is that the claimant should have been working as a District Commandant for a period of 8 years and the appointment to the said promotional post shall be made by the Competent Authority on seniority -cum- merit basis. No person shall be entitled to claim promotion on the basis of seniority alone. As per the Punjab State Government Instructions issued on 06.09.2001, certain guidelines have been laid down for DPC to consider the cases of promotion to the post of Class-I and Class-II namely, group ‘A’ and ‘B’ posts. As per the said guidelines, an eligible candidate is promoted on the basis of the seniority-cum-merit criteria, where merit is determined on the basis of benchmark awarded to the various aspects contained in the ACR of the officer, wherein marks are awarded against such entries made in the ACRs of the officers concerned for the relevant period.

Further, as per the records obtained by the appellant from the respondents under the RTI Act at the time of his claim for promotion to the post of Battalion Commander was first considered, his ACRs from year 1996 were considered. The Instructions dated 29.12.2000 would be applicable prospectively to the ACRs of the appellant for relevant periods which were prepared after those Instructions were issued. According to the Instructions, officers obtaining 0-14 marks out of a total of 20 marks would be graded over all ‘Good’. Thus, the appellant was entitled to promotion as he had been awarded 10 marks as per the proceedings of DPC.

The High Court in the impugned judgment further observed that the final reporting authority had downgraded the appellant as an ‘average’ officer for the above relevant period. As per the executive Instructions dated 10.01.1985 issued by the State Government, the Commandant General is the final Authority for the rank of the District Commander. That being the factual position, the downgrading of the performance of the appellant in his ACR for the above relevant period by the respondent No. 4 was not valid as the same was done without any authority and competence. The adverse entries in the ACR have deprived the appellant of his right of promotion to the post in question and therefore, the said adverse entries in the ACRs against the appellant are not legal and valid.

A perusal of the ACR for the period 2000-2001 reveals that though the general remarks stated that “He is very good and responsible officer” respondent No. 4 had given a grade which read, “I agree. An average officer”. The said entry shows that he had agreed to all the remarks of the ACR given in respect of columns 1 to 18 for that year by the Competent Accepting Authority, but he further stated assessed the officer to be an ‘average’ officer without assigning any reason whatsoever apart from his competence to make such adverse entries. The overall grading of the ACR is based upon the observations made by the Reporting Authority, Reviewing Authority and final Accepting Authority. As per the entries made by the respondent No. 4, he had agreed to the overall grading as given by the Accepting Authority. In such a case, he could not have downgraded the overall grading in the ACR by using the words “an average officer”. Further, if the comments made on 20.05.2004 by the respondent No. 4 on the ACR for the year 2000-2001 are being sought to justify the stand of denial of promotion to the appellant to the post in question, then the clarification needs to take effect from that date, i.e 20.05.2004. In such a case, the appellant was to be assigned 3nmarks as per the instructions for the year 2003, when he was ignored for the promotion for the first time.

The SC further stated that a perusal of the copy of the ACR for the period 2003-2004 reflects a true picture of the injustice that has been perpetrated against the appellant. The ACR has been written by Mr. Tejinder Singh, respondent No. 4 who was the Reporting Authority as the Divisional Commandant. The very same officer was also the Reviewing Authority as Deputy Commandant General. Further, the same officer also happened to be the Final Accepting Authority as the Commandant General, as is evident from his comment dated 30.09.2004. The fact that in the said year also the performance of the appellant had been graded as ‘average’ clearly reveals the malafide intention of the respondent nos.1-4 in deliberately denying the promotion to the appellant to the post in question. According to the respondents themselves, the executive Instructions dated 06.09.2001 have not been superseded by any other Instructions or rules framed by the competent authority. If these illegal downgrading entries in the ACR for the relevant period are ignored, then the appellant would attain 14 marks. As per the Instructions dated 06.09.2001, 12 marks were required for promotion to the post as per the benchmark fixed. Further, the adverse remarks for the period 1999-2000 were conveyed to appellant vide communication dated 28.06.2000 by the D.G.P-cum Commandant General. The representations dated 18.08.2000 and 25.08.2000 made by the appellant against the same were submitted to respondent No. 4. The said representation was rejected on 07.05.2001. The appellant had challenged the same by filing Civil Suit No. 70 of 2001, wherein the respondent No. 4 was impleaded as defendant No. 3. The civil suit was decreed on 15.03.2002 in favour of the appellant. The said judgment and decree passed in favour of the appellant has not been implemented by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, despite having attained finality, which clearly reflects the fact that the respondent No.4 was not fair in considering him for promotion to the post of Battalion Commander as provided under Rule 8(2) of the Rules. According to the Rules, the appointment to the promotional post shall be made on seniority-cum-merit basis. As per the ACRs placed on record, the appellant has fulfilled the aforesaid requirement of seniority-cum-merit by securing 14 marks, as per the Instructions in relation to all aspects entered in the ACR. Thestrong reliance placed upon the adverse remarks made by the respondent No.4, who has made the same without assigning any reasons, has resulted in the appellant being denied of the promotional benefit, even though the order of the respondent No. 4 was set aside by the judgment and decree in Civil Suit no. 70 of 2001. The action of respondent No. 4 in denying the promotional benefit to the appellant is tainted with malafides. It can further be observed from the record that it was respondent no.7 who had filed the reply on behalf of all the respondents in the writ petition proceedings before the High Court. It is important to note at this stage that respondent No. 7 happens to be an officer junior to the appellant, who was promoted to the post in question. The non-filing of written statement by respondent No. 4 traversing the allegations of malafide against him proves the malafide intention on part of the respondent No. 4. Therefore, there was no justification for the respondent No. 4 in denying the promotional benefit to the post of Battalion Commander to the appellant. SC also referred to an earlier case where it was held that if the ACR of the officer concerned is to be used for the purpose of denying promotion, then all such ACRs were required to be communicated to him, to enable him to make a representation against his adverse entries made in the ACRs.

As per the record submitted by the respondents, the appellant was given grade ‘A+’ for the year 2001-2002, but only 1 mark was assigned. According to the executive Instructions, the grade ‘A+’ is to be assigned 4 marks. Accordingly, if 4 marks are assigned for the ACR of the appellant for the period 2001-2002, then he would have scored 12 marks at the time of consideration for promotion in the year 2003, whereas admittedly, the appellant was required to achieve only 10 marks in order to be promoted to the post of Battalion Commander. Hence, if the calculation of marks made by the respondents on the various aspects in the ACR of the appellant is believed to be true, then also he has achieved the required benchmark. The action of the respondent No. 4 in deliberately ignoring the claim of the appellant is vitiated in law as the same is contrary to the Rules and records of ACR for the relevant period and Instructions issued by the State Government laying down certain guiding principles.

Therefore, the SC stated that the order of denial of promotion to the appellant, which had been affirmed by the High Court in its judgment and order passed in the Writ Petition and Review Application was liable to be set aside.

For the reasons stated above, the SC passed the following order:-

“(1) We set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in both the Civil Writ Petition and the Review Application and also the order of denying the promotional benefit by the respondents-Department to the post of the Battalion Commander from the year 2001-2002;

(2) Further, we direct the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 to reconsider the claim of the appellant in the light of our findings and reasons recorded on the contentious factual and legal aspects so that he could get higher post of Battalion Commander notionally to get pensionary benefits as he has been prematurely retired from service on 31.7.2007; and

(3) The said direction shall be complied with within 8 weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of this order and for the purpose of fixing his pensionary benefits and other monetary benefits for which he is legally entitled to and submit the compliance report to this Court.

The appeal is allowed in the above said terms with cost of Rs.10,000/- payable to the appellant by respondent Nos. 1 to 4.”

[ Reference:- CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6532 OF 2015 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) NO. 1640 of 2014) DALJIT SINGH GREWAL Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS (SC) dated August 21, 2015]

REVISED RATES OF TRANSPORT ALLOWANCE WITH EFFECT FROM 1ST APRIL, 2015

The Gov. of India, Ministry of Finance Vide OM no. 21(2)/2015-E.II(B) dated 6^th August, 2015 revised the Transport Allowance to Central Government Employees with effect from 1^st April 2015. The rates are given below. For new classification of cities, refer to my earlier post dated 29th July, 2015.

“NO WORK NO PAY” IS NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THE EMPLOYER IS AT FAULT – Supreme Court

In a decision dated July 31, 2015 of the Supreme Court of India, it was held that the principle “NO WORK NO PAY” IS NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THE EMPLOYER IS AT FAULT for delay. In this case, the order of the High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No.6466 of 2002 dated 02.12.2004 was challenged whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed against the order of denial of pay and allowances to the appellant for the period from 01.08.1997 till the date of his actual promotion i.e. 13.11.2000 and also the order dated 18.03.2005 dismissing the Review Application No.55 of 2005.

Background facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as under:- The appellant got enrolled in the Indian Army on the post of Store Keeper Technical/Sepoy on 19.03.1983 and was subsequently promoted to the rank of Havildar on 01.08.1989. While the appellant was so working, a Summary Court Martial (SCM) for the offences under Sections 41(i), 39 (a) and 63 of the Army Act was initiated against him. After completion of the inquiry and on proved charges by an order dated 03.06.1992, the appellant was sentenced to:- (i) reduction in rank; (ii) dismissal from service and (iii) rigorous imprisonment for one year in civil prison. Aggrieved by the Order passed in Summary Court Martial, the appellant preferred a statutory complaint under Section 164 of the Army Act. The Central Government vide Order dated 17.08.1994 commuted the punishment modifying it to one of severe reprimand and further remitted the sentence of dismissal from service directing reinstatement in service. However, it was held that the appellant was not entitled to any pay and allowances for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement in service. In compliance with the Order passed by the Central Government, the appellant was reinstated in service w.e.f. 29.10.1994. The appellant was again put to Summary Court Martial for committing offence under Section 54(b) of the Army Act and by an Order dated 18.02.1995; the appellant was awarded severe reprimand/red ink entry for the offence of loosing identity card.

Case of the appellant for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar came up for consideration before Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) on 01.08.1997; but the appellant was not considered for promotion and according to the respondents, the appellant did not meet the discipline criteria for promotion as the appellant was having two red ink entries during preceding five years. On appellant’s repeated representations for his promotion as per his seniority, finally his claim was considered by the DPC held on 15.03.2000 and he was granted promotion w.e.f. 01.01.2000 with ante-dated seniority w.e.f. 01.08.1997 along with his batchmates. However, no direction was issued regarding any pay and allowances to the appellant in the higher rank of Naib Subedar from the back date; but his seniority was maintained from 01.08.1997 when his batchmates have been promoted. Aggrieved by the order of the DPC, denying pay and allowances in the promotional post for the period between 01.08.1997 to 13.11.2000, the appellant filed W.P.(C) No.6466 of 2002 before the High Court of Delhi. Vide impugned order dated 02.12.2004, the High Court dismissed the writ petition observing that the appellant has no legitimate claim for payment of pay and allowances from a retrospective date on the principle of “no work no pay”. The Review Application No.55 of 2005 also came to be dismissed on 18.03.2005. In this appeal the correctness of the above orders passed in the writ petition and also the review application was challenged.

Contention of the appellant was that subsequently when the fresh DPC was held on 15.03.2000, the appellant was declared fit for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar w.e.f. 01.01.2000 with ante-dated seniority w.e.f. 01.08.1997 and while so, the appellant was arbitrarily deprived from getting pay and allowances and other benefits from 01.08.1997 and hence the appellant was entitled to get his pay and allowances for the period from 01.08.1997 till the date of his actual promotion on 13.11.2000. It was submitted that the respondents erroneously denied pay and allowances to the appellant when they themselves have granted him ante-dated seniority w.e.f. 01.08.1997.

The respondents contended that although the order imposing punishment on the appellant was passed by the Summary Court Martial on 03.06.1992 but the same was commuted only on 17.08.1994 and therefore the period of five years was rightly counted w.e.f. 17.08.1994 and therefore the appellant was not eligible to be considered for promotion prior to 17.08.1999. It was further submitted that on 01.08.1997, when the appellant’s case came up for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar, he did not meet the criteria for promotion as he had incurred two red ink entries during preceding five years and rightly the appellant was not given the pay and allowances from 01.08.1997 which benefit was given to him w.e.f. 13.11.2000 when he actually joined the said rank of Naib Subedar, but to avoid any injustice, his seniority was maintained from 01.08.1997 along with his batch mates.

As per the policy of the respondents, an individual cannot be considered for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar, if he has earned more than three red ink entries during the entire service and more than one red ink entry in the preceding five years of service. It is noticeable that when the case of the appellant came up for consideration on 01.08.1997, the first punishment/red ink entry had already expired i.e. on 03.06.1997 and only one red ink entry made on 18.02.1995 was on the record; but the DPC appears to have erred in ignoring the same. Considering the genuineness of the representations made by the appellant, DPC again considered the claim of the appellant and granted him promotion w.e.f. 01.01.2000 to the rank of Naib Subedar with a further direction that the seniority of the appellant will be maintained alongwith his batchmates from 01.08.1997. When appellant was granted ante-dated seniority w.e.f. 01.08.1997 alongwith his batchmates, we find no reason as to why he should be denied pay and allowances in the promotional post as Naib Subedar w.e.f. 01.08.1997 till the date of his actual promotion on 13.11.2000. The High Court has not properly appreciated these aspects and erred in holding that on 01.08.1997, the appellant was not eligible to be considered for promotion. When the respondents themselves have taken the view that the Order of the Government would be deemed to have taken from the date ofmoriginal sentence was passed i.e. 03.06.1992 and not from 17.08.1994, the date on which commutation/remission was granted by the Government, the High Court was not right in holding that the appellant was not eligible to be considered for promotion on 01.08.1997 and the impugned order cannot be sustained.

The respondents argued that the denial of pay and allowances was on the principle of “no work no pay” and no injustice had been done to the appellant since he had not actually worked in the promotional post of Naib Subedar during the aforesaid period. It was also submitted that the benefit of pay and allowances was rightly awarded w.e.f. 13.11.2000, the date on which the appellant actually assumed the rank of Naib Subedar but his seniority was maintained so as to protect his interest in his further promotions.

However, the Supreme Court even stated that, in the absence of a statutory provision, normal rule is “no work no pay”. In appropriate cases, a court of law may take into account all, the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The principle of “no work no pay” would not be attracted where the respondents were in fault in not considering the case of the appellant for promotion and not allowing the appellant to work on a post of Naib Subedar carrying higher pay scale. In the facts of the present case when the appellant was granted promotion w.e.f. 01.01.2000 with the ante-dated seniority from 01.08.1997 and maintaining his seniority along with his batch mates, it would be unjust to deny him higher pay and allowances in the promotional position of Naib Subedar.

Hence, the SC set aside the impugned orders passed by the High Court and the appeal was allowed with order that the respondents should release the arrears of pay and allowances to the appellant for the period from 01.08.1997 till the date of his actual promotion that is 13.11.2000 in the promotional post of Naib Subedar within eight weeks from the date of judgement.

(Ref: Supreme Court CIVIL APPEAL NO. 811 OF 2007 RAMESH KUMAR ...Appellant Versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Respondents decided on July 31, 2015)

HARMONIZATION OF RTI (FEE & COST) RULES AND APPEAL PROCEDURE RULES UNDER RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT, 2005

Government of India, DOPT sent to various authorities Vide letter No. 1/5/2011-IR Dated 10thJuly, 2015 expressing the need for Harmonization of RTI (Fee & Cost) Rules and Appeal Procedure Rules under Right to Information Act, 2005.

Earlier, the Government of India had notified a set of RTI Rules, 2012 dated 31.7.2012. While drafting the RTI Rules, 2012, it was stipulated that once notified, the State Governments would be requested to adopt these rules as it is, so that there might be uniformity in the matter of implementation of the RTI Act throughout the country. However,few States have not yet harmonized their fee rules with that of the Central Government.

Therefore, in the latest letter it is requested by the Central Government to various authorities mentioned in the letter to review their Right to Information (Fee & Cost Rules) and Appeal Procedure Rules.

FOR GOING ABROAD ON A PRIVATE VISIT, SEPARATE PRIOR PERMISSION IS REQUIRED.

Government of India, DOPT (Establishment Division) vide office memorandum F. No. 11013/8/2015-Estt.A-111 Dated July 27th, 2015 issued instructions regarding requirement of taking prior permission for leaving station/ headquarters for going abroad while on leave. This is in line with the existing instructions.

1. When a Government servant applies for leave for going abroad on a private visit, separately prior permission of the competent authority for such visit is also required. The requests of Government servants for such permission are to be dealt with expeditiously.

2. It has been decided that requests for permission for private visits abroad may be processed in the attached formats. In the event of failure on the part of the competent authority to communicate its decision to the Government employee concerned with 21 days of receipt of the application, the employee concerned shall be free to assume that permission has been granted to him.

SUPREME COURT: CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEES CANNOT SEEK REGULARIZATION WITH RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT

In a recent judgement of the Supreme Court dated 02-7-2015, it was held that contractual employees cannot seek regularization with retrospective effect when regularisation policy was not in vogue

Facts of the case: The appellants were initially engaged on the post of Assistant Manager (Civil) by the respondent No.1–Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority on contractual basis for a period of 89 days. Initial appointments of the appellants were not made against any sanctioned posts.

However, their engagement continued from time to time, and the appellants have been continuously working on the said post. On 20.11.2002, the respondent authorities published an advertisement for engagement to the posts of Assistant Manager (Civil). The appellants and similarly situated persons who have been engaged on contractual basis filed a Writ seeking for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent-authorities to regularise their services on the post of Assistant Manager (Civil) and to quash the aforesaid advertisement dated 20.11.2002. The appellants contended that as they were working continuously, the respondent authorities instead of issuing a fresh advertisement should have regularised their services on the said post. By the judgment dated 28.09.2005, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the advertisement dated 20.11.2002 and directed the respondent-authorities to consider the claim of the appellants for regularisation of their services on the existing vacancies which were directed to be filled up from the existing contractual employees as per the Regulation/Rules and fresh advertisement could be issued inviting applications from the general candidates only for remaining vacancies. Challenging the order of the learned single Judge, respondent authorities filed Special Appeal before the Division Bench.

Pending adjudication of Writ Petition before the single Judge, a scheme for regularization of the contractual employees was formulated wherein a policy was framed regarding regularization of 27 contractual employees who had been engaged initially for a period of 89 days and continued thereafter. The State Government, vide its letter dated 05.03.2008, approved the policy formulated by respondent No.1 for regularization of contractual employees. Pursuant to the policy decision, the appellants and other similarly situated contractual employees were appointed on the post of Assistant Manager (Civil) vide appointment orders dated 06.08.2010.

After joining the said post, the appellants filed a Claim Petition No. 174 of 2011 before the State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow praying for regularization of their services from the date of existence of vacancies, that is 20.11.2002, the date on which the advertisement was issued, for appointment to the post of Assistant Manager (Civil) and with all consequential benefits. The tribunal, vide its judgment dated 23.06.2011, allowed the Claim Petition and directed the authorities to consider the appellants’ claim for regularization of their services on the existing vacancies with effect from 20.11.2002. Aggrieved by the order of the tribunal, the respondent authorities preferred a writ being Writ Petition

before the High Court. The High Court, vide judgment dated 29.10.2013 relying on the

Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Uma Devi’s case (supra) allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondent authorities and quashed the order dated 23.06.2011 passed by the tribunal granting benefits to the appellants with retrospective effect. Additionally, the High Court also quashed the appointments of the appellants dated 06.08.2010 as ex-facie illegal and directed the authorities to initiate proceedings in respect of illegal appointments which were made in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution ofIndia.

After considering the facts of the case Supreme Court held that the Division Bench was not right in setting aside the appointment of the appellants particularly when nobody challenged the appointment of the appellants. Since the appointment of the appellants were made pursuant to the policy of regularization, the High Court was not right in quashing the appointment of the appellants as the same were never in question before the High Court. The plea that was raised by the appellants was only to seek regularization with retrospective effect from 20.11.2002 and the consequential seniority.

The SC further held that the appellants were appointed on the post of Assistant Manager (Civil) only pursuant to the policy decision of the respondents for regularisation of contractual employees and thus, the appellants cannot seek for regularization with retrospective effect from 20.11.2002, that is when the advertisement was issued, because at that time regularisation policy was not in vogue. By policy of regularisation, it was intended to give the benefit only from the date of appointment. The Court cannot read anything into the policy decision which is plain and unambiguous. Having accepted the appointment orders dated 6.08.2010 and also joined the post, the appellants cannot turn round and claim regularisation with retrospective effect.

With this, the judgment of the High Court quashing the appointment of the appellants vide appointment order dated 06.08.2010 was set aside. Also the appellants’ plea for regularization with retrospective effect was declined. [Reference:- Supreme Court decision dated July 2, 2015 in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4916 OF 2015 SURENDRA KUMAR & ORS. …APPELLANT (S) V/S GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIALnDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. …RESPONDENT (S)]

THE FUNNIEST OFFICE MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY THE FINANCE MINISTRY, GOI

On 17/07/2015, Department of Expenditure has issued an OM no.12(21)/E.Coord/2015 to its employees with the subject ‘Execss Expenditure Over Voted Grants’. This is not a new OM but it is being issued every year just before or during the Parliament session but never followed by anybody. I doubt whether those who are processing the OM itself is properly reading it or not.

It is simply quoting the Public Accounts Committee para 12 of its 36th report on action taken by the government on their observations/recommendations contained in the seventh report (15th Lok Sabha) on “Excess over Voted Grants and Charged Appropriations (2007-08) to the effect that no firm measures have been put in place by the Ministries/Departments concerned to avoid excess expenditure by the defaulter ministries. The OM also invited a reference to Rule 52(1) of the GFRs. The issue of such an OM is in vogue since the time GFR (General Financial Rules) came into existence. But who cares.

Now the funniest part of the Office Memorandum: In this monsoon session of the Parliament, Finance Minister already prepared to seek approval for a supplementary Grant to finance a package to the public sector banks floating on the Non-Performing Assets (NPA). In this background, my first question is whether the burden of NPA is a spontaneous incident noticed by the Finance Ministry after the last Budget session of the Parliament which necessitated for supplementary grant in the monsoon Session? If not, why it was not included in the Budget? When the Minister itself does not honour the rules and regulations, how they can control the subordinates? This is only one instance. Almost all supplementary requests if analysed would come to this category. Second question is, how many M.P.s are utilizing their grants fully or at least substantially during the financial year so that it is not lapsed?

( To read my various other blogs, visit my web site – www.manjaly.net and my book: http://www.amazon.in/FRAUD-IN-THE-INDIAN-CONSTITUTION-ebook/dp/B00SQKTADY)